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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of ) 
) Case No. 
LLOYD A# FRY COMPANY, ) 
) 13980 
Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Decision of the Utah Air 
Conservation Committee finding that emissions from the Lloyd A. 
Fry Roofing Company plant were in violation of Section 3.2, Code 
of Air Conservation Regulations. 
RELIEF ON APPEAL 
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company seeks a complete judicial 
hearing and review of this matter and reversal of a Decision and 
Orders entered by the Utah Air Conservation Committee. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Prior to September 4, 1973, the Manager of the Lloyd A. 
Fry Roofing Company (Fry) located at Woods Cross, Utah, received 
notice from Dr. Grant S. Winn, Executive Secretary of the Utah Air 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Conservation Committee that the emissions from the stacks at the 
plant were in violation of Section 3.2.1 of the Code of Air Con-
servation Regulations which provides: 
3.2.1 Single sources of emission from exist-
ing installations except incinerators and internal 
* combustion engines shall be of a shade or density 
no darker than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black) 
or an equivalent opacity. 
On September 4, 1973, an informal meeting was held 
between Fry officials, Winn, and other Air Conservation personnel, 
during which Fry contended that the emissions were composed mostly 
of uncorabined water vapor, which is not a contaminant. Air Conser-
vation personnel agreed to attend a demonstration at the Fry plant 
on September 5, 1973, which Fry asserted would show that the emissions 
from the stacks at the plant were 97% water vapor. 
On October 18, 1973, Fry officials attended a meeting 
with the Utah Air Conservation Committee during which Fry officials 
again stated that the emissions from the plant were not in violation 
and that enforcement personnel, in reading the emissions (plumes 
from the stacks) were not differentiating between uncombined water 
vapor and asphalt fumes. 
In a letter dated January 16, 1974, Fry was informed by 
Winn that the Woods Cross facility was in violation of Section 3.2 
of the Visible Emissions Regulations on September 6, 1973; September 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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27, 1973; October 3, 1973; October 4, 1973; October 9, 1973; and 
November 9, 1973, and Fry was ordered to submit to the Air Conserva-
tion office a request for a variance accompanied with a compliance 
schedule or cease operation of the plant. Pursuant to 26-24-11, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953f Fry requested a hearing before the Air 
Conservation Committee to answer the charges, which commenced on 
April 4, 1974, before a sub-examining committee represented by 
William C. Quigley as counsel and John Spencer Snow as legal advisor. 
Rex J. Hanson represented Fry. On April 5, 1974, the hearing was 
recessed, reconvened on May 15, 1974, and concluded on that date. 
The Hearing Committee affirmed the Order of the Executive Secretary 
dated January 16, 1974. 
Fry then filed a Motion for Review of the Hearing Commit-
tee^ Decision, which was reviewed by the Utah Air Conservation 
Committee on December 19, 1974, which affirmed the Decision of the 
Hearing Examiners. Representatives of Fry did not attend and were 
not invited to attend this meeting. 
On January 15, 1975, Fry appealed the Decision of the Air 
Conservation Committee to the Third Judicial District Court, which 
appeal, pursuant to a Motion filed by the Attorney General, was 
dismissed by the Court on January 31, 1975, upon the ground that 
the Air Conservation Committee's Order was reviewable only by the 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
-3-
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Fry then filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme 
Court on February 4, 1975. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE LAW 
In 1967, the 37th Utah Legislature enacted Senate Bill 
36# The Air Conservation Act. Subsequently, the Act has been 
amended, in 1969, 1971 and 1973. The substance of the Air Conserva-
tion Act is now contained in Utah Code Annotated, Title 26, Chapter 
24. 
Pursuant to Section 26-24-1.5, the Utah Legislature 
declared the public policy and the purpose of the Air Conservation 
Act to be: "(a) The achievement and maintenance of such levels 
of air quality as will protect human health and safety; (b) the 
prevention of injury to plant and animal life and property to the 
greatest degree possible; (c) the fostering of comfort and conven-
ience of the people; (d) the promotion of economic and social 
development of the State of Utah; and (e) the facilitation of enjoy-
ment of the natural attractions of the State of Utah." 
Section 26-24-2 sets out the definitions of "air comtami-
nation", "air contaminant source", "air pollution", and additional 
definitions having direct application to the creation of the Air 
-4_ 
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Conservation Committee or to the Board of Health. Section 26-24-2 
reads as follows: 
26-24-2. Definitions. - As used in this act: 
(1) "Air contaminant" means any particulate 
matter of any gas, vapor, suspended solid, or 
any combination thereof, excluding steam and water 
vapors. 
(2) "Air Contaminant source" means any and 
all sources of emissions of air contaminants 
whether privately or publicly owned or operated. 
(3) "Air pollution" means the presence in 
the ambient air of one or more air contaminants 
in such quantities and duration and under condi-
tions and circumstances as is or tends to be 
injurious to human health or welfare, animal or 
plant life, or property, or would unreasonably 
interfere with the enjoyment of life or use of 
property, as determined by,the standards, rules 
and regulations adopted by the air conservation 
committee. 
*** 
Under Subsection 1, air contaminant is defined as any particulate 
matter or any gas, vapor, suspended solid, or any combination 
thereof, excluding steam and water vapors, (emphasis added) 
Section 26-24-3 states that the Division of Health shall 
have the responsibility for the administration of the Air Conserva-
tion Act. This Section, when read in conjunction with Section 26-15-5, 
sets forth the powers and the duties of the Board of Health with 
respect to the establishment of rules, regulations and standards. 
The Utah Air Conservation Committee was created and estab-
lished pursuant to the authority set forth in Section 26-24-3 .1. 
In this Section, the Legislature stated that there was to be created 
-c;.. 
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within the Division of Health an air conservation counsel which 
has since been amended to read: "The Air Conservation Committee." 
This Committee has been delegated the authority to set forth air 
quality standards and to determine the maximum amount of contaminants 
that may be emitted by any particular source under the law. 
The general makeup of the Committee, its purposes and 
duties are set forth in Section 26-24-4 through 8. However, these 
powers and duties, dealing with the control of air pollution, must 
be read in conjunction with Section 26-24-2(3) which states: 
(3) "Air pollution" means the presence in 
the ambient air of one or more air contaminants 
in such quantities and duration and under conditions 
and circumstances as is or tends to be injurious to 
human health or welfare, animal or plant life, or 
property, or would unreasonably interfere with the 
enjoyment of life or use of property as determined 
by the standards, rules and regulations adopted 
by the air conservation committee, (emphasis added) 
In addition, 26-24-5(1) grants the Air Conservation Committee the 
power to make rules regarding the control abatement and prevention 
of air pollution from all sources and again, in Subsection (2), the 
Committee was given the power to establish air quality standards 
on a regional basis. Furthermore, Subsection (4) grants the Committee 
the power to hold hearings related to any aspect of or matter in the 
administration of the Air Conservation Act. Subsection (5) grants 
the Committee the power to issue such orders as may be necessary 
-6-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to effectuate the purposes of the Air Conservation Act and to en-
force these orders by all appropriate administrative and judicial 
proceedings and to cause the institution of judicial proceedings to 
secure compliance with the Act. Subsection (12) states that the 
Committee shall determine "by means of field studies and sampling 
the degree of contamination and air pollution in all parts of the 
State." It is apparent that the Committee is required not only to 
conduct field studies, but also must conduct the sampling evalua-
tion to determine possible violators of the Act. The transcript 
is void of any evidence whatsoever regarding samples that were taken 
or of any field studies given to "smoke readers" to accomplish this 
objective. 
The procedure that must be followed by the Committee in 
adopting standards of quality for ambient air, the notice that must 
be given and the hearing requirements are set forth in Section 
26-24-10. In Subsection (2) the Air Conservation Committee is given 
broad power "to establish such emissions control requirements, by 
rulef regulation or standard as in its judgment may be necessary 
to prevent# abate or control air pollution." 
The Utah State Board of Health has adopted a Code of 
Air Conservation Regulations pursuant to authority of Section 
26-24-5 and 26-14-5. Section 3.2, Visible Emissions, of the Code 
of Air Conservation Regulations reads: 
-7-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3.2.1 Single sources of emission from exist-
ing installations except incinerators and internal 
combustion engines shall be of shade or density no 
darker than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black) or 
an equivalent opacity. 
Section 3.2.6(d) of the Code, Exceptions, states, "An 
emission failing to meet the standard because of the effect of 
uncombined water shall not be in violation." 
Section 1.1.26 of the Code defines: 
Ringelmann Chart means the Chart published 
by the U. S. Bureau of Mines (Information Circular 
7718) which illustrates graduated shades of grey 
to black for use in determining the light obscuring 
capability of particulate matter. 
Section 1.1.31 of the Code defines: 
Equivalent opacity means the relationship of 
opaqueness or percent obscuration of light to 
the Ringelmann Chart for shades other than black 
and is approximately equal to the following: 
Equivalent Opacity Ringelmann No. 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
However, this, again, must be read in conjunction with Section 
26-24-2(3) which defines air pollution. 
No guidelines are set out as to the manner in which an 
inspector should make an evaluation or "reading" of the plume to 
determine whether the emission is in violation of Section 3.2.1 of 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Code prohibiting a shade or density no darker than 
Ringelmann Chart (40% black) or aii equivalent opacity; .*..^ ., „*iat 
distance the inspector must be from, the stack, the diameter of the 
- * i n i s niride, Hie number rind 
time sequence of observations, and * * circumstances under which the 
obse. • * j.i>f - In" *.'^  ti I ual iuni „ pos 11 n JII 
of the sun, weather conditions, wind, humidity, < : HI the background 
of the plume The evaluation process depends solely oi i the subjective 
judgment of the inspector at the time the smoke reading occurs 
(Tr., Vol I pp 49, 50, 51 ) . • ' \ 
' , ' '• Tt ie sat .i irai it ai id coal: :i nq asphalt i s purchased from : . ; 
Trumbull Asphalt Company :t Woods Cross (Tr., Vol. II, 
"tv.j L blown, v-- •••• ^ ean^ it has been distilled to the extent 
that a "high degree of the volatile oi J s have been dr ivon oil before 
it iS soici to Frj (Tr., Vol. II, p. 59) . A much higher temperature 
I s used in the blowing process than the temperature of the asphalt 
when i t is used by Fry to saturate the felt in its manufacturing 
process (Tr. , Vol, I I , pp. 61, 62) . in the "blowing process" the 
a s p h a l t Li-' nv i ni i WMII I 11 vi | under i t s M u s h p o m i ,<i |riiinil( i,hn m dim 
degrees , which , hot ter than the f lashpoint ,-. the asphalt in the 
, ,f ([in,,,,, asphalt a II, tei: 
i t i s "fu l l blown,1"1 ranges from 120 to 140 degrees 
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The specifications Fry receives from Trumbull state the heat loss by 
the American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM, D-6) which deter-
mines the loss on heating of fumes. Fry's specification requires 
that the test be run at temperatures of 465 degrees. At this point, 
the heat loss measurement (loss of fumes) equals .67 degrees heat 
loss by weight over a period of 8 hours, a heat loss 0.08375 percent 
occurs during each hour which is the air contaminant or particulate 
emitted by the Fry process (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 117, 118, Ex. 17). 
The manufacturing process at the Fry plant in the produc-
tion of roofing materials involves a roll of asphalt used at the 
beginning of a single production line from which the felt is wound 
off in loops on a series of rollers into a pre-saturation area where 
asphalt heated to a range from 430 to 450 degrees impacts against 
one side of the felt, which is composed of 6 to 9 percent moisture 
content. When the asphalt contacts the side of the felt sheet, 
moisture is driven off the opposite side in the form of steam. There-
after, the sheet of felt continues to move in loops around the 
rollers into a dip tank where the felt is further saturated and 
coated with asphalt on both sides (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 227, 228). It 
was uncontroverted that the effect of impacting asphalt on one side 
of the felt sheet during the pre-saturating process was to drive out 
the moisture content in the form of water vapor from the felt. After 
the moisture is driven from the felt, it is caught in overhead metal 
-10-
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hoods and becomes the major part of the emissions from the |»lanl 
(TT „ , Vol, 1, in, <M')) , The amount of particulate or asphalt emitted 
during the process is approximately 5 percent of the total emission 
or in .1 i".Jt io MI" will PI urnpni l-n asphalt of 20 to 1 ITi",f w^ o.. a., 
pp. 229, 230) There is no combustion involved in the Fry manu 
facturing process. The emissions I'runi I ho pie -sal urah or - • i-
rator are caught in the hoods and with the aid of a fan are emitted 
from two stacks, the greatest density ai id volume beiiM.) emi 
the west stack because there is hardly any vapoj left in the felt 
sheet after i+- passes through the spraying and dipping operations. 
M o , : ' t "'if t |< < 'apoi- is emitted from the west stack (Tr., v^*. .*., 
pp. 243, 244; Vol. II, pp. 1 34, 1 35; Ex. 1 5E) . 
2. 
THE FACTS 
; On September 5, 1 9 73 , =i1 the :i nvi tat I c: n of Pi" y Alvin 
Rickers, Assistant Chief of Air Qualj ty# Brent Bradford, and Lynn 
Price visileil I lni Wuoth Cross julianl whoi C* they f ihsei' "<»i I I hi i missions 
from the stacks during the normal operation of I he plant, 'While 
there they examined the emissions when LIio hit slieHt <*M; in oceed-
ing through the asphalt saturators and also observed the emissions 
from the stacks when the felt sheet was '"broken" or when, I: elt 
sheet was i passing through the asphalt saturators, the purpose 
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being to compare the opacity of the emissions with the water vapor 
forced out of the felt and into the stack and the emissions when 
the felt was broken, permitting no moisture from the felt to become 
part of the emissions. (Opacity is the amount of limitation or 
inhibition which prevents an observer from seeing objects through 
a plume; 40 percent opacity means 40 percent of your vision through 
the smoke plume is obscured (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 21# 22)). Photographs 
were taken of the emissions from the plant during normal operation 
and during the operation when the felt was "broken" which show 
conclusively that the smoke plume during normal operation is composed 
almost entirely of water vapor (Ex. 15f 15A, 15C, 15D and 15E). 
Readings of the plume were taken by Alvin Rickers who informed the 
Fry people the emissions from the plant during normal operation 
were not in violation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 64). 
In a letter (Ex. 1), Fry was charged with violations on 
six different dates on which readings or evaluations were made by 
personnel from the Utah Air Conservation Committee or from the Davis 
County Department of Health. All of these men were graduates of a 
smoke school conducted by the Air Conservation Committee. 
The course given at the smoke school consisted of the use 
of a smoke generator powered by an oil burning furnace which was 
so arranged that an air, water or oil mixture could be varied to 
produce incomplete combustion, the result being a black or a white 
-12-
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plume. The generator stack had attached to it an electric eye 
1111 i i ™ JI nil* "d'un t*\\ line npfictlv ill Hit plume record I ess nf I In rnlor. 
The students were taught by first showing them a p] ume of smoke 
and telling them the percent of opacity rivet a per. i -.- : 
Then the student had the opportunity of reviewing the procedure 
on a basis of comparison from what they had been to] d i nitially • 
(Tr
 f V c >] I, p|: > 1 5 | ( ] 6) . The school lasted for approximately 
three days (Ti ' , Vt : J! I ,' p. 20) However, there was no method ut-
il i zed! at Llie school ai id 1:1 i< 3 h I, m Ienil s wr.M e nut I iranied I u i cini a 
smoke plume which was partially composed c\ «•*•• vapor, called a 
"wet plume" (
 f Vol , I , p. 23) " • - in 
the opacity estimates given by the students and the training must 
be repeated often. Sometimes, i t took the whole course of" three 
days, or coiiti n/iia] repetitioi I to get some student's "eyeballs 
calibrated" so they could make estimates that met the requirements 
(Ti ,, Villi I 11 "«J| As stated, there wa,< im Itaiinintf aya n J al >l o 
for the reading of a wet plume other than experience in the field 
W • ' ( 3 
plume after the moisture had evaporated out * . * v 
The determinate . .,r; ,. / ^ ap. . , -/aporatea f 
the plume depends upon the judgment of the reader (Vol. I, pp. 50, 
51). The distance the plume travels before the water vapor is 
-] 3-
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dissipated depends upon the weather conditions, the amount of 
humidity in the air, and a "number of other things" (Tr., Vol. I, 
pp. 73, 74). There is no other process in the State of Utah where 
felt is saturated with asphalt as occurs in the Fry plant (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 75), and none of the smoke readers who read the emissions 
from the Fry plant as being in violation; that is, of a density 
darker than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black) or an equivalent 
opacity, had any prior training in reading or evaluating plumes with 
the same or similar composition of water vapor as that contained in 
the Fry plumes. No tests had ever been made to determine the subjec-
tive variations on reading which would exist between the different 
smoke readers (Tr., Vol. I, p. 31). There are various factors, 
such as humidity, temperature, time of day, position of the sun, 
and background beyond the plume, which must be considered in making 
a proper evaluation of the density of a plume (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 32, 
33). It is generally more difficult for students to get their 
eyes calibrated to reading white smoke than it is for the student 
to read black smoke (Tr., Vol. I, p. 36). The evaluations are made 
by smoke readers in the field without any monitoring devices (Tr., 
Vol. I, p. 43). Any water vapor in the plume creates greater opacity 
and would make the plume more difficult to evaluate (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 43). Therefore, the determination of opacity is made upon the 
smoke reader's subjective observation and judgment (Tr-' Vol. I, p.49). 
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The first date on which an alleged violation occurred 
was September 6, 1973, whereupon an I nspector found the west stack 
of \\ui Fry t»I*;<"H"if in havo an emission of between 45 percent to 
60 percent opacity; no reading was made of the east stack (Prosecu-
tion l-ix, I In I ) The 4l) percent to < A -^ ki,t opacity rmiqe ail le<j 
edly represent - 'hr- highest and lowest >f ' readings made oi: I that 
date (Recort . m d i n g s of Fact an< I C< ... usions of I «aw and Decision, 
dated October x,, 1974). However, the transcript is void of any 
evidence to support this charge or any evidence that Fry was in 
vii >1alien of the Utah Code of Air Conservation Regulations, Section 
3.2, Alvin Rickers, Winn's assistant . ?estified that i - v " --
7 percent varia bion r . . J >< -• ' , 
individuals (Tr., Vol . . i* . : s«- : blowing for error 
of 5 percent, i f tliii s inspector road I lie* op-to it y il im p e r c e n t , 
such was not a violation. 
The second date on whi ch an alleged violation occurred 
was September 27, 1973, wherein George R. Chlarson, an employee of 
the Utah State Division of Health, Air Quality Section, read the 
east stack of the Fry plant to have an emission of between 35 percent 
to 55 percent opacity,. Apparently, there was no reading made of: the 
emission I rem I In1 wi'sl .1 iiok I li.nl iiil.e, IIM*H ,,|.,III (ho IS In I'I 
cent opacity alleged represented the highest and lowest of seven 
readings made that day (Prosecution Ex. ] 10; Record, Findings of 
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Fact# Conclusions of Law and Decision dated October 17, 1974). The 
original evaluation made by Chlarson was outside the premises of 
the Fry plant some 200 feet from the stack (Tr., Vol. I, p. 138). 
Subsequently, these findings were presented to a Mr. Springer, the 
Office Manager of the Fry plant (Tr., Vol. I, p. 138). The evalua-
tion of Chlarson began at 11:00 and lasted about 1 hour and 55 
minutes. However, the testimony is uncontroverted that when the 
moisture is driven from the felt by the impact of the hot asphalt, 
the moisture is caught in an over-head hood which is emitted from 
the west stack. It is impossible for the east stack to have a more 
dense emission than the west stack (Tr., Vol. II, p. 134), which 
certainly effects the credibility of Chlarson's observation or read-
ing. 
The third day an alleged violation occurred was October 
3, 1973. On that date Richard L. Harvey, an Administrator of 
the Environmental Health Services for the Davis County Health Depart 
ment made one observation and found emissions from the west stack 
of the Fry plant to have an opacity of 55 percent and an emission 
from the east stack had an opacity of 30 percent (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 148, 155; Prosecution Ex. 1, 11; Record, Findings of Fcict, Con-
clusions of Law, and Decision dated October 17, 1974). The reading 
occurred at approximately 12:44 p.m. on the County right-of-way 
which is 1500 South at Woods Cross, Utah (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 147-149). 
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At this time the reading was taken approximately 200 to 300 f:ef?l 
from the stack (Tr, Vo] T, p. IS VI . The plume had travels d 
approximately 46 to 50 ieet iiom the lip of the stack before the 
reading was made (Tr., Vol. I, p. 1 54). However, Harvey's notes 
and memorrindur ufcato no est" i.mate :i)f d i stance with respect to when 
dissipation ^ water vapor occurred from the plume and the distance 
from whic . wh», • 11 t 111 *. read i rig war. t ak e in 
(Prosecution Ex. No. ll f 1 2 ) . - • -\ \wU. -^^ •>: observation which 
lasted for approximately 30 second- , 155, ] 57). 
Furthermore, the sun was approximately overhea 3 i* this time i n a 
southeasterly direction, and was not at hi/, back (Tr., VoJ , 1 „ 
p . •• . 
The fourth date on whi ch an alleged violation occurred 
was October -J AI I hair I, i me Brent: C! Urarlford, i n Ifliii1 irou -
mental Health Specialist for the Utah State Division of Health, 
Quality Section, visited the Fry plant purpose nl nuikiwi «JII 
evaluation of the emissions from that plant (Tr., Vol, I m i, Inn
 f 
114) Bradford had been at. the Fry plant on Septembei '•, I'M.i, it 
the invitation of the Fry people (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 108). On October 
4, 1974, Bradford entered the Fry property without their permission 
ami tTie.ru-1> m.nir .HI i^val u.'ii ion of Hie emission from f:'he plant" (Ti 
V o l . T, p • 114) The evaluation occurred at approximately 10:05 
a.m. approximately feet from the stack. However, at the smoke 
* ** 
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school they were taught that evaluations should occur at a distance 
from the stack of approximately 2h times the length of the stack 
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 117). The standard procedure in reading a smoke 
plume is to have the sun at the smoke reader's back (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 119). The evaluation by Bradford lasted approximately 45 minutes 
and at that time he found emissions from the west stack averaging 
between 40 percent to 50 percent (Prosecution Ex. 9). However, the 
charges set forth in the Executive Secretary1s letter of January 16, 
1974, allege opacity of the west stack emission at 40 percent and the 
east stack at 55 percent (Prosecution Ex. 1). Furthermore, there is 
no record of any emission from the east stack as being in violation 
of the regulations. Bradford's analysis dealt only with the west 
stack (Prosecution Ex. 9). The transcript is void of any evidence 
with respect to a violation of the east stack on October 4, 1973. 
When Bradford made the evaluation of the plume emitting from the 
Fry plant, it contained water vapor. The only training that Brad-
ford had had in the reading of a plume containing water vapor was 
in an asphalt mulch plant somewhere in the State of Utah (Tr., Vol. I, 
pp. 120, 121). Furthermore, Bradford stated that the length of time 
one observed an emission was not discussed at the smoke reading 
school, nor was it covered in any of their studies (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 130). During the reading taken by Bradford, he was approximately 
100 to 125 feet from the stack. His evaluation was that the opacity 
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in the emission immediately above the lip of the stack was approxi-
mately 80 to 90 percent, but that where the watei vapmi rJi sh i paten 1 
i - - . ranged from ^ ^ ^ percent (Prosecution 
Ex. Howevei >^- :nes with his estimate which was given 
c . . : -,l.cil. of! l ; • • ranged between 
40 and 55 percer* * Bradford concluded that in 
making his evaluation ;.;*-, > elines 
taught at the smoke school , His testimony •- - follows: 
Q. And, I think you are trained in smoke school 
to make these evaluations about two and a half 
times the length of the stack? 
1 That's ':!••' school book solution, yes. 
(. i no, ill your opinion? 
2 • • a guideline, yes. But, uiily as a guide-
line. Obviously, you can't always get the two 
and a half times the stack distance away from. 
Q. If you follow the guidelines there, there 
is more probability that your evaluation would 
be accurate, woul d i t not? 
•: :: A # i don't "know that 1 am prepared to answer 
that. 
Q. Isn't that why you were given those guide-
lines in your training, to get the most accurate 
evaluation possible? 
A. Again, I would assume so. I don!t know that 
I would be prepared to answer that as far as being 
able to determine what would be the best. That's 
what the school book answers, that's all II can say , 
1.M-
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-xxQ*?- Q* Well, you would agree that the guidelines 
have some value or you wouldn't be taught them, \: t nr 
;,a1I . would you? 
a Q ; A. Well, I would agree that someone takes an 
absolute value. I don't know—again, I don't know , . ./• 
r that I am in a position to judge that (Tr., Vol. I, 
pp. 117, 118) . ,fj 
The fifth date on which a violation allegedly occurred
 ;.: 
was October 9, 1973 (Prosecution Ex. 1). On that date William H. 
Terburg, an Environmental Health Specialist with the Davis County 
Health Department visited the Fry plant for the purpose of 
evaluating the effluent from their stacks (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 212-
214). On that date Terburg made one reading which lasted approxi-
mately 5 minutes and found both stacks with emissions of between 
40 to 60 percent opacity at a point 20 feet above the stacks 
(Prosecution Ex. 13, 14). The evaluation occurred at approximately 
11:20 a.m. at approximately 150 feet west of the stack on 15th 
South (Tr., Vol. I, p. 215). Terburg stated that at 20 feet above 
the stack the plume was void of any water vapor (Tr., Vol. I, p. 218) 
At that time, there was a slight breeze which changed during the 
evaluation (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 218-221). However, there is no indi-
cation as to what his reading actually represented or whether it l 
was just an estimate or a range that existed in the opacity of the 
plume. Furthermore, there was no indication of the highest and 
lowest point that existed on that date (Record, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decision dated October 17, 1974). The 
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emission from neither stack was in violation if the reading was 
40 percent; his testimony that the density of emissions from the 
east and west stack was equal is incredible considering the uncon-
troverted evidence that emission from the west stack contains most 
of the water vapor and is always more dense than the emission from 
the east stack. 
The sixth date on which Fry was charged with violation was 
November 9, 1973, whereupon Alvin E. Rickers and Casper Nelson, made 
a visit to the Fry plant. Alvin Rickers is employed by the Utah 
State Division of Health as Assistant Chief of the Air Quality 
Section. Rickers assists in teaching at the smoke school in the 
area of meteorology. The instruction is given at the school that 
the reading should be made from 6 to 12 inches above the stack. 
The reason, of course, for doing it at that point is that the 
electric eye is reading the opacity at the top of the stack and 
evidently dissipation occurs at a rapid rate (Tr., Vol. I, p. 55). 
Rickers stated that opacity is the decrease in transmittance of 
light. His training in determining the "break point" in a plume 
where the water vapor evaporated or dissipated from the plume 
consisted of a one-time observance of a plume from Kennecott Copper 
Corporation, which does not have the same process as Fry (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 74). On November 9, 1973, Rickers made four readings over a 
period of 12 minutes at 3-minute intervals, in three out of the 
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four readings the east stack was found to have a 50 percent opacity, 
the fourth reading was of 45 percent opacity. The west stack was 
found to have a 40 percent opacity on two readings and a 45 percent 
opacity reading on two readings (Prosecution Ex. 4 (card)). However, 
the charges made for that date reflected 45 percent opacity on the 
west stack and 50 percent opacity on the east stack (Prosecution Ex. 
1). Furthermore, the Findings of Fact of October 17, 1974, show a 
single reading occurring on November 9, 1973. An apparent dis-
crepancy exists in the Prosecution's evidence (See Prosecution 
Ex. 9; Record, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decision 
dated October 17, 1974). In addition, Rickers' evaluation was that 
there was 90 percent opacity at the lip of the east stack and 80 
percent opacity at the lip of the west stack. However, after 
dissipation, the opacity in the east stack was 50 percent and the 
opacity of the emission from the west stack was 45 percent. This 
is clearly inconsistent with the record. 
Dr. Dale Parker who has a PhD Degree in Environmental 
Biology from the University of Utah was called by Fry as a defense 
witness. Although not certified by the smoke school, Dr. Parker 
had worked 21 years at Dugway and had extensive experience with 
wet clouds or plumes (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 224, 225). In his testimony 
he described the entire Fry process and explained that the average 
temperature of the asphalt when it impacts the felt is 430 degrees 
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to 450 degrees. The felt sheet is composed of 6 to 9 percent moisture 
content# which is driven off on the felt side opposite from point of 
impact with the asphalt in the form of steam. From that point the 
steam goes through a cooling process as it is emitted from the 
stacks. He estimated the amount of particulate or asphalt in the 
plume is less than five percent. No combustion takes place in the 
process. The ratio is 20 to 1 of water to asphalt (Tr.# Vol. I, 
pp. 227-230). In his opinion the emissions from the Fry plant could 
not be in violation of the 40 percent opacity test during normal 
operation (Tr., Vol. I# p. 254). In his opinion the testimony of 
the smoke readers was based strictly on their ability to read 
opacity of a plume and not on their ability to differentiate between 
a wet plume and a dry plume (Tr.# Vol. I, p. 256). 
Raymond L. Chaffinf a defense witness, testified that he 
was Chief Chemist for the Environmental Test Group of Core Labora-
tories. He has been a certified smoke reader since May of 1971 
(Tr.# Vol. II, pp. 66, 67). He had observed the plume emitted 
from the Fry plant and was unable to observe any line of demarca-
tion where the moisture came out of the emission or plume (Tr.# 
Vol. II, pp. 69, 70). In the smoke schools the students are not 
given any training in reading a wet plume and any evaluation of 
the opacity of a wet plume is only a guess. In his opinion, the 
reading of a wet plume is completely subjective (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 
71, 72). 
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Donald D. Foster, a Chemical Engineer and Director of 
the Environmental Control for Fry, testified that Fry is in com-
pliance with the EPA Weight Emission Regulations as they relate 
to the State of Utah and the Wasatch Front (Tr., Vol. II, p. 121). 
On the dates of the alleged violations, he had computed from 
company records the percentage of water vapor in the plume as 
compared to asphalt fumes. The percentage ranged from 97 percent 
to 98 percent (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 139, 140). He had observed 
plumes from the Fry Woods Cross plant 40 or 50 times, and had never 
observed a sharp break or definite break inthe plume, "It seemed 
to sort of drift off and dissipate." (Tr., Vol. II, p. 142). There 
is no distillation of the asphalt in the Fry process (Tr.ir Vol. II, 
p. 145). The difference between the Fry process and the process in 
asphalt mulch plants is that in the latter there is combustion 
(Tr., Vol. II, pp. 150, 151). Equivalent opacity is another term 
for the Ringelmann Chart. It is important in accuratly reading a 
plume of any type to take readings in a sequence or series of 
intervals of time, because of variations in the speed of manu-
facturing process, changes in air temperature and wind direction 
(Tr., Vol. II, pp. 151, 152, 153). The emissions from the Fry 
plant on the dates of the alleged violation were not in violation 
of Section 3.2 of the Air Conservation Code (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 160, 
161). 
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The Air Conservation Committee called Carl D. Luedtke# 
an EPA Consultant as a rebuttal witness. He has a Bachelor1s 
Degree in Chemical Engineering and a Master's Degree in Chemistryf 
and had qualified as a smoke reader (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 166, 167). 
His experience with asphalt saturators was in the Los Angeles area, 
none of which were Fry plants; they were equipped with emission 
control devices, but used a similar process to that of Fry (Tr., 
Vol. II, pp. 169, 170). He had never read the Fry plume (Tr., 
Vol. II, p. 194). He had observed the Fry plume on one occasion 
while on an inspection tour of the facility as an EPA consultant 
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 194). In his opinion, based upon assumptions 
that the dip-tanks in a Celbtex plant in California were similar 
in dimension to those of the Fry plant, the "break felt" test 
was not reliable to show the percentage of water vapor in the 
plume (Tr., Vol. II, p. 183). However, Foster testified that the 
assumptions made by Luedtke were incorrect in that the Fry tanks 
were smaller, the asphalt cools after saturating the felt, distil-
lation does not take place, and only minimal fumes come off the 
asphalt (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 210-217). Luedtke was also of the 
opinion that taking the average of consecutive readings at inter-
vals was not a more accurate way of determining opacity, despite 
his admission that there would be a variance in subjective readings 
made by the same individual.(Tr., Vol. II, pp. 207, 208). Luedtke 
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also testified that there was no connection between particulate 
matter and opacity (Tr., Vol. II, p. 187), which is contra to the 
well accepted fact that the smaller the pieces of particulate 
therein, the more dense is the plume. 
There was no evidence from any source that the emission 
from the Fry plant "is or tends to be injurious to human health 
or welfare, animal or plant life or property." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE HAS THE BURDEN 
OF PROVING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION, 
INCLUDING THE ABSENCE OF VISIBLE WATER VAPOR 
The State of Utah, through its administrative agency, 
the Air Conservation Committee, is the party seeking relief in 
this action. Obviously, it has the burden of proving all elements 
of its case. 
The letter from Dr. Grant Winn to Fry dated January 16, 
1974, charges Fry with violations of Utah's Visible Emissions 
Regulations, Section 3.2, Code of Air Conservation Regulations. 
Apparently, the Subsection of 3.2 claimed to have been violated 
is: 
3.2.1 Single sources of emission from existing 
installations except incinerators and internal com-
bustion engines shall be of shade or density no darker 
than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black) or an equi-
valent opacity. 
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Section 3.2.6 states: 
d. An emission failing to meet the 
standard because of the effect of uncombined 
water shall not be in violation. 
which conforms to 26-24-2, which excludes water vapor as a 
contaminant. 
The violation alleged against Fry is criminal in nature, 
and the State has the burden or proving each and every element of 
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is an essential element 
of the State's case to prove that on the dates charged, the Fry 
plume either contained no visible water vapor at all, or that such 
visible water vapor was taken into account and excluded when the 
opacity reading was made. Again, equivalent opacity in excess 
of the Ringelmann Chart is not a violation if the opacity (inhibi-
tion of transfer of light through plume) is caused by water vapor. 
This requires the State to prove a negative proposition which does 
not in any way shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The 
general rule is stated in 1 Jones on Evidence, § 5:8: 
As stated in an earlier section a part of the 
plaintiff's burden may lie in the necessity 
of proving a negative assertion as an element 
of his claim. This is true not only as to the 
plaintiff but also as to other parties to this 
* action, and it may be said that whoever asserts 
a claim or defense that is negative in form or 
depends upon a negative proposition has the 
burden of establishing the truth of the asser-
tion. This is only another way of saying that 
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he who affirms must prove; and in cases involv-
ing negative propositions the courts seem not 
to have regarded the form of the issue as 
material. 
In reading the transcript, one gets the unmistakable impression 
that it was Fry rather than the Committee which had the burden 
of proof. Because of continuous communication between the Hearing 
Examiners, the State and Federal EPA personnel during recess out-
side of the presence of defense counsel, it was necessary to make 
an objection, which was sustained by the Legal Advisor (Tr., Vol. I, 
p. 127). 
POINT II 
THE STATE HAS NOT MET THE BURDEN OF PROVING 
ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION 
The evidence is uncontroverted that in making the "readings" 
which were the basis for the charges that the Fry plume violated the 
Visible Emissions Regulations, the observers relied only on their 
subjective judgment; no scientific aids or equipment were used. In 
fact, a Ringelmann Chart was not used because the Fry plume was 
white in color, which required the observer to evaluate the plume 
on the basis of equivalent opacity; that is, to compare in his 
mind the shade of density of the Fry plume with what he remembered 
as being No. 2 density on the Ringelmann Chart. A traffic police-
man may be able to distinguish between an automobile traveling at 
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a speed of 20 miles per hour and one going twice as fast. He may 
not need a speedometer or radar to make this evaluation, yet no one 
would suggest that a 20 mile-per-hour speed limit should be enforced 
solely by the policeman's visual judgment. It is common knowledge 
that we all view things differently and two people with 20-20 eyesight 
may still have a totally different perception of the same physical 
object, especially with respect to such intangibles as color, shade, 
tone# intensity, etc. If one ever attempted to purchase a shade of 
paint to match another shade (seen only a few minutes earlier) the 
difficulty in correctly matching the desired shade would be apparent. 
The description of the smoke school curriculum set forth 
at length in the Statement of Facts will not be repeated here. 
Suffice it to say, the State would close down this plant based 
upon the subjective testimony of graduates of a 3-day course, whose 
training consisted of observing the degree of opacity of a plume 
of smoke, absent any water vapor under controlled conditions. In 
attempting to evaluate the Fry emissions the "smoke reader" would 
observe the Fry plume under varying weather conditions and then try 
to compare the plume with an image from memory learned at an earlier 
time during his school training. The school did not, and could not, 
give any training on evaluating the opacity of a wet plume. The 
training for analyzing wet plumes consisted of the observer, accom-
panied by an "experienced observer," making one or two observations 
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of a wet plume in the field, emitted from a process vastly differ-
ent from the Fry manufacturing process* The Fry process does not 
involve combustion as does the process used in asphalt mulch plants 
which contain much more particulate and would tend to cause moisture 
to separate or dissipate from the plume more readily. The diffi-
culty in reading the Fry plume is enhanced by the requirement that 
opacity be evaluated after the water vapor has dissipated from the 
cloud, which would be subject to varying wind conditions, humidity 
and light conditions. The testimony was clear that the temperature 
of the emission as it leaves the stack is higher than that of the 
ambient air. Obviously, the plume would be subject to a cooling 
action beginning on the edges which would cause a gradual condensa-
tion of vapor from the plume starting on the outside and proceeding 
in a gradual manner towards the center as the plume expanded geomet-
rically in moving away from the lip of the stack (Tr., Vol. I, p. 226). 
There was evidence that it is desirable to "re-calibrate 
the eyeballs" of a smoke reader every six months, because the train-
ing does wear off. However, there was no evidence offered as to 
how fast it wears off, whether gradually or in sudden increments or 
whether the degree to which it wears off varies with individuals. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence of the visual acuity of any of 
the observers who made the readings on which the charges were based. 
Exhibit 3, a study made by the U.S. Department of Health, Education 
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and Welfare, in 1967, contains studies on page 28 which show the 
wide variation which 6 allegedly trained plume observers can derive 
in observing a plume whose opacity is measured by scientific instru-
mentation. Indeed, it should be noted here that the smoke school 
training course used a photo electric eye to measure the accuracy 
of the students' readings. In Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, 486 
F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) the court severely questioned the ability 
of a visual observer to read plume opacity and indeed, sent back 
for further consideration a 10% opacity standard promulgated by the 
EPA. The court pointed out that the fact that visual observation 
may be "a cheaper and faster method of determining compliance," 
but that fact would not suffice to uphold a method of enforcement 
which was otherwise illegal. See general discussion at 486 F.2d 
pp. 400-401. See also, Essex Chemical v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 
427 (D.C. Cir. 1973) at p. 432. 
In Bortz Coal Company v. Air Pollution Commission, 279 
A.2d 388 (Pennsylvania)# the company was charged with permitting 
smoke to emanate from its stack which was darker than #2 of the 
Ringelmann Smoke Chart. This charge was based on the visual obser-
vation of a State employee. In overturning the finding of the 
Air Pollution Commission, the Court ruled: 
Visual test and observations are not 
adequate evidence of a violation where 
recognized scientific tests are available. 
(279A.2d at 398). 
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We anticipate that the Respondent will rely on State vs. 
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, 495 P.2d 750 (Ore. App. 1972) for 
affirmance of the Air Conservation Committee's decision. There was 
no showing that the operation of the Oregon plant was the same as 
the Woods Cross plant. The evidence in that case was uncontroverted 
that the plume from the Oregon plant was a wet plume; i.e., the 
emission from the stack included water droplets. The Court held 
the decision of the lower court involved a jury question; that because 
of the nature of the training given smoke readers as to wet plumes, 
the admissibility of their testimony presented a close question, but 
since they testified the defendant's plume obscured 80 percent or 
more of the background (more than twice the 40 percent required to 
constitute a violation) and since there was no showing that the amount 
of visible water in defendant's plume could have had a substantial 
impact on the readings, the Court resolved the close question of 
admissibility in favor of the State. 
In the case at Bar there was a substantial showing as to 
the amount of water vapor in the emission, and in no instance was 
a reading made as high as 80 percent. Furthermore, the evaluations 
of the Fry plume were made in a haphazard manner in which the in-
spectors used no uniform guidelines. 
The witness, Chlarson, made seven readings on September 
27, 1973, on the east stack, of which three were in violation, the 
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highest being 55 percent. Nothing more than a "wisp at times" was 
observed from the west stack. The testimony was uncontroverted 
that the heaviest emission comes from the west stack. 
The witness, Harvey, made one thirty-second observation 
on October 3; admitted he did not follow guidelines recommended at 
the smoke school (Tr.f Vol. I, p. 155# Ex. 11). 
The witness, Bradford, on October 4, 1973, commenced his 
evaluation at 10:00 a.m., the first observation being outside the 
company property about 200 feet from the stacks, and completed his 
observations on company property. In addition, his entrance on 
company property was without permission. The wind was minimal; he 
did not estimate wind velocity, nor could he tell exactly the direction 
of the wind (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 117-120). His observation lasted fifty 
minutes. Normally, he would take readings every five minutes. He 
was unable to give the minutes and seconds of how long he looked at 
the plume during each observation. He had made prior evaluations 
from asphalt mulch plants (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 120-130). He wrote the 
results of his observations on a business card and gave it to 
Springer, Fry's Office Manager. In a summary contained in a letter 
to Winn, he said the emissions from the west stack averaged 40 to 
50 percent (Ex. 9); 40 percent was not in violation and the addition-
al 50 percent could easily be accounted for by subjective variation. 
The letter of January 16, 1974, listing the dates on which Fry was 
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charged with violations showed the west stack at 40 percent, the 
east stack 50 percent, which was amended at the hearing to show 
the east stack was not in violation. 
The witness, William Terburg, testified to a reading of 
the Fry plume on October 9, 1973. He made one continuous observa-
tion for five minutes from 11:25 until 11:30 a.m. His evaluation 
of the emission from both stacks was 40 percent to 60 percent 
(Ex* 13). He did not know whether the sun, which at that time 
would not have been to his back, had any effect on the accuracy of 
his evaluation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 220). 
The witness, Alvin E. Rickers, on November 9, 1973, at 
11:25 to 11:33 a.m., took two readings of each of the stacks, which 
he wrote on a business card which he gave to Springer, the Fry Office 
Manager. He read the emissions from the east stack higher than 
those of the west stack despite the uncontroverted evidence that 
the heaviest emission exits from the west stack. In this, his 
testimony is not consistent with the majority of the other smoke 
readers. The business card says nothing about the circumstances 
or weather conditions under which the evaluations were made. In a 
memorandum of that date to Winn, he gave more detailed information, 
other than the number of readings which was not mentioned in the 
memorandum. 
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The lack of uniformity and variance between the evalua-
tions made by the foregoing witnesses certainly casts reasonable 
doubt on whether the emissions from the Fry plant were in violation 
of the "40 percent equivalent opacity11 regulation. 
Considering the penalties provided by the Statute as 
punishment for violations of the Code of Air Conservation Regula-
tions , due process would certainly require that Fry be notified in 
advance of the emission evaluations so that arrangements could be 
made to obtain evidence to rebut the charges. In any event, the 
notice of violation should apprise Fry of the circumstances exist-
ing when the evaluations were made. 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the charges of 
the Air Conservation Committee are not supported by substantial 
evidence. Substantial evidence is defined in Bortz Coal Co. v, 
Air Pollution Commission, supra., as follows: 
"substantial evidence" is such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion, and 
more is required than a mere scintilla of 
evidence or suspicion of the existence of 
the fact to be accomplished. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION OF THE AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE FIND-
ING FRY IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 3.2.1 OF THE CODE OF 
AIR CONSERVATION REGULATIONS IS IN VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND 
AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1 OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
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Section 26-24-2(3) of the Air Conservation Act defines 
pollution as follows: 
(3) "Air pollution" means the presence of 
ambient air of one or more air contaminants in 
such quantities and duration and under conditions 
and circumstances as is or tends to be injurious 
to human health or welfare, animal or plant life, 
or property, or would unreasonably interfere with 
the enjoyment of life or use of property, as deter-
mined by the standards, rules, and regulations 
adopted by the air conservation committee. 
There was no evidence that the emissions from the Fry 
plant caused or tended to cause any of the deleterious effects 
listed in the foregoing statute. Opacity does not equal pollution. 
A wet plume can be 100 percent opaque even though it contains no 
pollutants whatsoever. Anyone who has observed steam from boiling 
water knows this pure water vapor can be totally opaque. 
The evidence adduced at this hearing shows that eyeball 
plume readings in the field cannot be made with reasonable pre-
cision and opacity and even if it could be measured precisely, 
is not an adequate measure of the amount of pollution the plume 
contains. The Committee^ witnesses conceded that subjective varia-
tion between observers could reach 7 percent and possibly 10 percent. 
See also the results of the tests conducted in the study under the 
auspices of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(ex. 3, p. 28) which shows the wide variation in the observations 
of six allegedly trained observers of a plume whose opacity was 
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measured by scientific instruments, variations in stack diameter, 
gas velocity, moisture content, weather and light conditions will 
cause plumes to have different opacities even though they contain 
the same weight of pollutants. Inspectors are not taught, and 
probably couldn't be taught, how to subjectively evaluate these 
variables. 
The fact that water vapor is excluded in determining 
whether the emission violates opacity standards in confirmation of 
the fact that opacity caused by water vapor is not a violation. The 
committee's witnesses contend that they could evaluate the opacity 
of the plume at a point after the water vapor had dissipated from 
the plume. Considering multiple variables, there is no scientific 
foundation for the contention that the point where all of the water 
vapor has left the plume can be accurately determined, so that only 
the opacity attributable to the particulates can be evaluated. 
"Due process" prohibits the use of opacity limits as 
a legal standard, because the opacity cannot be measured accurately 
and cannot be reliably correlated with pollution. Section 3.2.1 of 
the Code of Air Conservation Regulations should be held invalid as 
a violation of "due process" if reasonable men can differ on whether 
there was a violation. The probability of such differences between 
the evaluations of the Committee's witnesses in uncontroverted. 
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Section 3.2.1 does not conform to 26-24-2(3) of the Air Conservation 
Act, since the degree of opacity does not equal the degree of pollu-
tion and the statute is directed to the control of air pollution. 
Therefore, Section 3.2.1 should be held invalid. Violation of 
Section 3.2.1 creates a conclusive presumption that a degree of 
opacity of a shade or density darker than No. 2 Ringelmann Chart 
(40% black) or an equivalent opacity, is irrebuttable proof of the 
degree of air pollution. Similar legislation has been held invalid 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the recent case of Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441 (1973). In that case "a state statute established 
different tuition rates for resident and non-resident students 
and adopted the student's legal address at the time of application 
as the sole criterion for determining his residency throughout the 
entire period of attendance. Students who had applied from out of 
state but had acquired all of the attributes of bona fide residency 
brought suit. Sustaining an injunction against enforcement of the 
statute, the court said: 
In sum, since Connecticut purports to be con-
cerned with residency in allocating the rates 
for tuition and fees at its university system, 
it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to 
deny an individual the resident rates on the 
basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption 
of nonresidence, when that presumption is not 
necessarily or universally true in fact, and 
when the State has reasonable alternative means 
of making the crucial determination. Rather, 
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standards of due process require that the State 
allow such an individual the opportunity to 
present evidence showing that he is a bond fide 
resident entitled to the in-state rates. 
See also, U.S.D.A. v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), and Cleveland 
Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
POINT IV 
THE AIR CONSERVATION ACT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER 
Section 26-24-10(1) of the Act requires the Air Conserva-
tion Committee to conduct public hearings in adopting the standards 
of quality for ambient air. Subsection (2) of this Act states: 
(2) The committee may establish such emission 
control requirements by rule, regulation or 
standards as in its judgment may be necessary 
to prevent, abate, or control air pollution. 
These requirements may be for the state as a 
whole or may vary from area to area, as may be 
appropriate to facilitate accomplishment of 
the purposes of this act, and in order to 
take account of varying local conditions. In 
adopting these emission control requirements, 
the committee shall conduct public hearings in 
the same manner and under the same terms and 
conditions and with the same notice as required 
in subsection (1) of this section. 
Even though the Committee is required to conduct public hearings, 
the Statute does not say that the Committee is required to consider, 
take into account, or in any way be governed by information obtained 
at the hearings. In fact, it may disregard any such information. 
Committee may adopt whatever regulations it feels 
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to prevent, abate or control air pollution, with no restraint or 
guidance from the Legislature. It is the judge and jury of what 
regulations should be adopted to achieve air quality. As was said 
by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 
55 S.Ct. 837: 
The delegated power * * * is not canalyzed 
within banks that keep it from overflowing. It 
is unconfined and vagrant. 
The Act does not set out any definite standards to guide the 
Air Conservation Committee other than its discretion as to what 
is good and proper for the safety and health of the public. Section 
26-24-11(1)(b) requires the Executive Secretary shall be conference, 
conciliation and pursuasion endeavor to eliminate the violation 
before written notice is served as provided in Subsection A. The 
extent, duration and scope of such efforts are to be determined 
within the sole discretion of the Executive Secretary. This appears 
to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power or even to 
a certain extent a delegation of judicial authority. 
Section 26-24-13(1)(a) sets out penalties for violation 
of the Act: 
(1)(a) Any person who violates any provision 
of this act, or any rule, regulation, order (other 
/-:/'o;to- ' than an order requiring compliance with an imple-
mentation plan), or standard in force under this 
act, other than section 26-24-16, or who causes or 
permits to be caused air pollution as defined in 
section 26-24-2 of any air resource of the state, 
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shall be guilty of an offense and subject to a 
fine of not more than $10,000 for each day of 
violation. Any person who knowingly violates any 
requirement of an applicable implementation plan 
adopted by the committee more than thirty days 
after having been notified in writing, by the execu-
tive secretary, that such person is violating such 
requirement, shall be guilty of an offense and 
subject to a fine of not to exceed $25,000 for 
each day of violation in the case of a first offense, 
and not to exceed $50,000 for each day of violation 
in the case of second and subsequent offenses. Any 
person who violates any order requiring such person 
to comply with the requirements of an implementa-
tion plan shall be guilty of an offense and sub-
ject to a fine of not to exceed $25,000 for each 
day of violation in the case of a first offense, 
and not to exceed $50,000 for each day of violation 
in the case of second and subsequent offenses. 
Note that a person "guilty of an offense" is subject to the 
penalties listed. If this offense is criminal, which it appears 
to be, defendant is entitled to a jury trial in accordance with 
77-1-8 U.C.A., 1953. At the commencement of the hearing before 
the Examining Committee, Appellant expressly stated that by par-
ticipating in the hearing, Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company was not 
waiving its right to a jury trial; that it purpose in appearing 
was to cooperate with the Committee and follow the Statute as it 
now exists, despite doubt concerning its constitutionality. 
The Act is so vague, especially with reference to the 
procedures required and the type of action involved, that it fails 
to meet reasonable constitutional standards of exactness and speci-
ficity. 
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CONCLUSION 
No one can deny the laudable objective of the Clean Air 
Act, and the sincerity of the Air Conservation Committee in 
promulgating its regulations to achieve air quality; however, it 
is no less important that constitutional and legal safeguards of 
long established rights be not swept away in this "Ecology"' age. 
On the record, we submit that this Court should reverse the decision 
of the Utah Air Conservation Committee and remand the matter for 
judgment in favor of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WADSWORTH & RUSSON 
1 ( ' . ^ : . • " • • • . : • • • • 
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